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Abstract
Background: In early October 2015, 12 nations signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), promoted
as a model ‘21st century’ trade and investment agreement that other countries would eventually join. There are
growing concerns amongst the public health community about the potential health implications of such WTO+
trade and investment agreements, but little existing knowledge on their potential health impacts.
Methods and results: We conducted a health impact review which allows for a summary estimation of the most
significant health impacts of a set of policies, in our case the TPPA. Our analysis shows that there are a number of
potentially serious health risks, with the following key pathways linking trade to health: access to medicines, reduced
regulatory space, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), and environmental protection and labor rights. We also note
that economic gains that could translate into health benefits will likely be inequitably distributed.
Conclusion: Our analysis demonstrates the need for the public health community to be knowledgeable about trade
issues and more engaged in trade negotiations. In the context of the COP21 climate change Agreement, and the UN
Sustainable Development Goals, this may be an opportune time for TPPA countries to reject it as drafted, and rethink
what should be the purpose of such agreements in light of (still) escalating global wealth inequalities and fragile
environmental resources—the two most foundational elements to global health equity.
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Background
In early October 2015, 12 nations signed the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPPA) (Table 1). The TPPA was
promoted as a model ‘21st century’ trade and investment
agreement that other countries would eventually join,
bypassing stalled multilateral negotiations within the
World Trade Organization (WTO). There is growing
interest in academia about the links between trade and
health, and previous analyses have established both posi-
tive and negative impacts on health. On the positive side,
if trade stimulates economic growth and economic gains
trickle down to the wider population, growth in trade can
contribute to improvement of health outcomes [1], as well
as engendering access to novel health technologies and fa-
cilitating regulatory convergence [2]. However, there is
growing concern that the new generation of 21st century
trade agreements is more likely to undermine health re-
sults due to their inclusion of a range of novel trade, and
especially investment provisions [3].
Based on analyses of recent free trade agreements
(FTAs) involving the U.S. (the real force behind the
TPPA), and leaked draft texts of the negotiations, early
public health concerns centered on potential TPPA im-
pacts on costs to medicines, tobacco and alcohol control,
diet-related regulations and public health policy-making
more generally [4–8]. In November 2015 the final Agree-
ment was released publicly. Given its 6000+ pages and
that many of its provisions will be subject to interpreta-
tions by dispute or arbitration panels, the assessment that
follows is preliminary. Our findings are based on a health
impact assessment that covers the TPPA’s major health-
related aspects. Our analysis followed a standard health
impact assessment (HIA) protocol: during the screening
stage we determined the need for a HIA and established
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various links between FTAs and health based on a re-
view of existing frameworks in the public health litera-
ture; [4, 9–11] during the scoping stage we decided to
focus predominantly on the health risks of the TPPA to
keep the HIA within scope for this article; during the
appraisal stage we assessed (initially leaked and later
publicly released) chapters and provisions identified
during the screening stage for their specific health
impacts.
Access to medicines
From the outset of negotiations it was expected that the
TPPA would strengthen patent protection measures be-
yond those in the WTO TRIPS Agreement (that is, creat-
ing ‘TRIPS+’ obligations), and it has. The TPPA allows
patenting of existing pharmaceuticals already under patent
for ‘new uses, new methods of using…or new processes’.
These are all TRIPS+ provisions which could increase the
‘evergreening’ of patents (the continuous issuance of new
patents on essentially the same drug) beyond their original
20 years of patent protection provided by the WTO’s
TRIPS Agreement. This will delay generic competition
and the lowering of costs for such drugs. The TPPA also
allows for an unspecified period of ‘patent term exten-
sions’ for ‘unreasonable delays’ (more than 5 years after ap-
plying for a patent) before the drug is approved for the
market. The WTO TRIPS Agreement never included this
on the basis that 20 years of patent protection was ad-
equate to account for such delays.
The most contentious provision is the inclusion of bio-
logics for the first time in a trade agreement. Expensive to
research and produce, and important for the treatment of
cancer and immune disorders, the cost to individuals or
insurers for these new treatments can reach hundreds of
thousands of dollars annually [12, 13]. Pharmaceutical
companies in the US wanted 12 years of monopoly, pri-
marily by preventing governments from making available
to generic companies the clinical trial data the companies
filed when applying for their patent. This ‘data exclusivity’
provision would delay the creation of generic versions of
biologic drugs, or ‘biosimilars’ (i.e. drugs made from living
organisms). The TPPA provides for 8 years of such data
protection, but allows Parties (the countries that ratify the
Agreement) to offer only 5 years if other forms of patent
protection guarantee the same 8 year minimum of market
exclusivity. These provisions will slow affordable access to
such products. Four TPPA countries (Mexico, Peru,
Malaysia and Vietnam) are given longer compliance pe-
riods for all of the provisions on pharmaceutical intellec-
tual property rights, but even with these extensions they
are unlikely to catch up economically with the wealthier
Parties’ abilities to afford costly new drugs.
The TPPA at the same time affirms that “a Party may
take measures to protect public health in accordance
with…the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health’
(art.18.50, ¶3), a reference to the 2001 Doha Declaration
clarifying that countries are able to issue compulsory
licenses for generic drugs in a public health emergency.
Although this may provide some flexibility for govern-
ments, the Doha Declaration has only rarely been invoked
for conventional drugs (in the earlier 2000s, mostly by
upper-middle-income countries and primarily for antire-
trovirals), and one can anticipate political pressures from
the US to prevent its use for biosimilars even after the
period of data and market protection have passed, if the
patent has not yet expired [14]. Public health lobbying and
country-specific concerns also succeeded in excluding
from the TPPA’s provisions pharmaceutical products and
medical devices purchased under a national government
procurement program (where governments negotiate for
bulk purchases to get the best price) and post-market sub-
sidisation. Reached late in the negotiations, and not what
the US-based pharmaceutical industry wanted, this exclu-
sion limits the ability of industry to affect the functioning
(and drug costs) of these national programs, currently
affecting just 4 countries: New Zealand, Australia, Japan
and the U.S.
Since intellectual property is considered a form of in-
vestment in the TPPA, regulatory reforms to a Party’s
policies could be liable to an investor suit under Investor
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions (discussed
later). One such case, under the North American Free
Trade Agreement’s) Chapter on ISDS, concerns Eli Lilly’s
USD 500 million claim against the decision by Canada,
supported by its courts, to revoke patents on two drugs
that failed a ‘promise doctrine’ of demonstrable utility
made at the time of patent filing. This case is complex














Australia $61,925 5.19 % 7 9.4 % 4
Brunei $40,979 0.06 % 7 2.5 % 10
Canada $50,235 6.37 % 4 10.9 % 5
Chile $14,528 0.92 % 10 7.7 % 8
Japan $36,194 16.42 % 7 10.3 % 3
Malaysia $11,307 4.62 % 7 4.0 % 7
Mexico $10,325 1.21 % 5 6.2 % 13
New
Zealand
$37,896c 0.59 % 6 9.7 % 6
Peru $6603 0.72 % 6 5.3 % 17
Singapore $55,979 1.10 % 9 4.6 % 3
United
States
$52,980 62.14 % 6 17.1 % 7
Vietnam $1908 0.66 % 6 6.0 % 22
aCurrent US$ in 2014 b2013 data c2011 data d2015 data
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[15] and still unresolved; but it underscores the potential
for ISDS to be used to challenge domestic pharmaceut-
ical policies.
In sum, the TPPA provisions, prima facie, appear inco-
herent with the UN decision in December 2015 to estab-
lish a High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines. This
panel is charged with seeking solutions to the present
high cost of new medicines that prevent access for most
by balancing ‘the rights of inventors, international hu-
man rights law, trade rules, and public health in the con-
text of health technologies’ [16]. Margaret Chan recently
challenged think tanks to answer crucial questions for
agreements like the TPPA, including what constitutes
fair profits for the pharmaceutical industry, whether
market exclusivity conferred by patent protection actu-
ally stimulates innovation, and if these agreements do
reduce access to medicine, can we really consider them
progress at all? [17].
Reduced regulatory space
Another public health concern is that provisions in the
TPPA would likely reduce governments’ regulatory space.
Three Chapters in particular do so: on Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPS), on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT), and on Regulatory Coherence. The first two are
based on similarly named agreements under the WTO
system, but are ‘WTO+’ with new provisions; the third is
a novel TPPA addition.
The WTO SPS Agreement defers to the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission (a body jointly administered by
the WHO and the FAO) with the presumption that if a
WTO member country’s food safety regulations are co-
herent with those in the Codex, there is no conflict with
liberalisation obligations. The TPPA’s SPS Chapter does
not directly defer to Codex, but rather to an unnamed
group of ‘international standards, guidelines and recom-
mendations,’ introducing potential ambiguity over what
should be the referent standards. Moreover, if countries
exceed whatever international standards are used as ref-
erents, they will be required to produce ‘documented
and objective scientific evidence’ justifying such provi-
sions, weakening a government’s ability to exercise the
‘precautionary principle’ when there is little evidence or
scientific consensus.
Similarly, the TPPA TBT tightens WTO TBT require-
ments. The WTO TBT requires that governments’ tech-
nical regulations must ‘not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective’. This applies to
health regulations (art.2.2), creating a problematic ‘neces-
sity test’ that has often been a basis for disputes over health
and environmental regulation, wherein governments have
to justify to complainant countries why the regulation is
necessary to achieve a legitimate policy goal [18]. If they
fail to do so, the complainant countries can initiate a trade
dispute. The TPPA TBT in addition to this requirement
states that “nothing in this Chapter shall prevent a Party
from adopting or maintaining technical regulations or
standards, in accordance with its rights and obligations
under this Agreement” (art.8.3, ¶5, our emphasis). The
highlighted text means that governments can really only
regulate according to the rules under the TPPA’s TBT.
One of these new TPPA rules requires Parties to ‘cooper-
ate with each other’ in setting new international standards
(the sort that Codex might adopt) that ‘do not create
unnecessary obstacles to international trade’ (art.8.5 ¶).
This may pre-empt a future TPPA dispute over such
standards, but at the risk of lowering standards in def-
erence to trade.
Both the TPPA TBT and Regulatory Coherence Chap-
ters add new requirements for participation in regula-
tion setting in any one TPPA country by government or
‘interested persons’ from other Parties, defined as ‘a na-
tional or an enterprise’ (art.1.3). The appeal of creating
uniform regulations is understandable insofar as it re-
duces transaction costs for commercial firms, even as it
increases the public costs of complying with the admin-
istrative and consultative requirements. More critically,
these provisions open the door for ‘regulatory capture,’
[19] where transnational tobacco, alcohol, and food corpo-
rations from any TPPA country are allowed to be present
in the formulation of regulations that affect their own
business practices in any other TPPA country.
Still problematic ISDS measures
The TPPA excludes the Regulatory Coherence Chapter,
but not the SPS or TBT Chapters, from its ISDS (investor-
state dispute settlement) provisions. ISDS is one of the
most controversial inclusions in FTAs. Investment treaties
are not new; over 3200 bilateral or regional treaties have
been crafted since 1959, of which over 2500 remain in
force [20]. Until recently, these treaties have been simple
agreements intended primarily to avoid foreign investors
having their assets directly expropriated, especially in
countries with weak or politically compromised judicial
systems. Newer treaties are more extensive, and the use of
ISDS by foreign investors to sue governments over regula-
tory decisions that they believe have compromised the
value of their investments has risen dramatically in the
past decade [21]. A 2013 review of ISDS claims found that
40 cases involved health or environmental protection [22],
including food safety, pharmaceuticals and tobacco con-
trol measures. Most of the environmental disputes have
important indirect health implications.
There are several criticisms of how ISDS presently
functions [23]:
 decisions made in closed hearings by a three-
member tribunal of lawyers, some of whom have
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had connections with the multinational corporations
whose cases they were arbitrating;
 a small ‘elite 15’ of these lawyers deciding on the
majority of cases involving large awards;
 the increasing size of awards;
 the lack of any appeal process; and
 the public cost to governments of defending such a
suit (averaging USD 8 million but often much
higher), even if the investor loses (although their
‘win’ rates have been rising)
Government websites argue that the TPPA’s ISDS
Chapter has addressed many of these concerns. It has
not. It retains the requirement for a ‘minimum standard
of treatment’ of foreign investments, including ‘fair and
equitable treatment’ (art.9.6, ¶1), shorthanded as FET.
Over the past decade, FET has become the most com-
mon standard on which investors initiate, and tribunals
rule on, a dispute. FET is subject to interpretation dur-
ing disputes, and the expansive interpretation of FET by
tribunals is allowing investors to challenge a range of
government policies, including those involving environ-
mental and human health. The TPPA states that ‘an in-
vestor’s expectations’ by itself (the conditions under
which an investor could have legitimately expected their
investment to operate and which contributed to their
decision to invest) is insufficient to sue for loss or dam-
age (art.9.5, ¶4), and is claimed as a safeguard to prevent
excess awards. But these expectations can nonetheless
be used by a tribunal in conjunction with other argu-
ments in their ruling, which still allows for substantial
interpretative room for tribunal members.
Similar claims that the Chapter ensures the rights of Par-
ties to regulate in the public interest are based on Article
9.15, which states that “nothing in this Chapter shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining
or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this
Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that invest-
ment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory ob-
jectives” (our emphasis). However, the five italicized words
effectively undermine the entire Article, since govern-
ments can undertake such regulations only if they abide by
all the rules of the ISDS Chapter. This offers scant pro-
tection from investor suits over changes in health or
environmental regulations or policy. Curiously, ‘non-
discriminatory regulations1…designed for legitimate
public welfare objectives’, including health and the en-
vironment, ‘do not constitute indirect expropriation,
except in rare circumstances’ (Annex 9-B, ¶3(b)). This ap-
pears to afford more regulatory latitude in cases based on
indirect expropriation (the loss of an investment’s value
‘equivalent to direct expropriation’), although it still leaves
the interpretation of what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ objective
or a ‘rare’ circumstance to the judgement of three invest-
ment lawyers.
The TPPA does create new avenues for greater trans-
parency, including a provision for amicus curiae (‘friend
of the court’) submissions from third parties, which
could include public or environmental health profes-
sionals or civil society groups introducing new evidence
or argument. However, there is nothing binding on a tri-
bunal to allow such submissions or to take these submis-
sions into account in their rulings. More importantly,
there is nothing in the Chapter that corrects the lack of
an appeal process or tribunalists’ conflicts-of-interest.
TPPA Parties have committed to preparing a ‘Code of
Conduct’ for tribunalists. As this is still to be drafted its
content is unknown, but it may adopt elements of the
November 12, 2015 proposed text on ISDS released by
the European Commission (EC) [24]. The Code of Con-
duct proposed by the EC, however, is little more than
exhortations to good behaviour by tribunalists, unlikely
in itself to make much difference.
Tobacco exclusion?
Public health lobbying and early support from a few TPPA
countries (notably Malaysia) led to a provision allowing
Parties at any time to exclude any tobacco control meas-
ure from the Agreement’s ISDS provisions. This exclusion
will prevent tobacco transnationals from challenging a
country’s control measures as they have done, under other
existing ISDS treaties, with Australia’s plain packaging
laws and Uruguay’s tobacco package warning labels. Philip
Morris Asia’s case against Australia’s plain packaging laws
was recently dismissed, a victory for public health, al-
though the case was dismissed on jurisdiction, not on the
merits of the case, leaving the fate of similar cases un-
known [25]. Moreover, since the TPPA states that Par-
ties are free to access any other agreement or treaty
that offers greater liberalization or protection, tobacco
transnationals in one TPPA country will still be able to
treaty-shop and initiate ISDS suits against another
TPPA country, even if both countries have accepted the
exclusion. The TPPA tobacco exclusion may exert nor-
mative pressures for tribunals established under other
ISDS treaties to dismiss them as frivolous, but that will
have to be seen.
That TPPA Parties thought it sufficiently important to
exclude tobacco control measures from ISDS, as well as
taxation measures unless one of the Parties also agrees with
an investor going forward in a dispute, suggests govern-
ments’ discomfort with how ISDS presently functions, at
least in certain policy realms. That an exclusion was not
similarly extended to public health regulations following
WHO or international ‘best practices’ guidelines around
food safety or security, or prevention of alcohol abuse, is
Labonté et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:25 Page 4 of 7
disappointing even if understandable, given tobacco’s now
historic ‘exceptionalism’.
Limited environment protection and token labour rights
The TPPA follows the US’s recent practice of including
Chapters on labour and environment in its FTAs, partly to
contain criticism from unions and environmental groups.
The TPPA Environment Chapter does contain one im-
portant gain: binding language that prohibits Parties
from providing fishing subsidies that ‘affect fish stocks
that are in an overfished condition’ (art.20.16, ¶5 (a)).
This is a novel provision with indirect health benefits,
particularly for developing countries reliant for an af-
fordable food source on local fisheries that may be
under threat from offshore ‘factory fishing’. The rest of
the Chapter, however, is replete with hortatory language
(such as ‘strive to ensure’ a Parties’ own laws offer ‘high
levels of environmental protection’), although Parties
‘shall not’ (a forceful term) fail to enforce their own
laws if doing so ‘affects trade or investment between
Parties’ (art.20.3, ¶¶3,4). In other words, weak enforce-
ment of weak environmental laws should not be used
to give a TPPA Party a trade or investment advantage,
which is the main concern of the Chapter and not en-
vironmental protection per se. Of seven multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) generally found in
recent US FTAs, the TPPA only references three, disap-
pointing many environmental groups.
The Chapter is also essentially silent on the major envir-
onmental health issue of the day: climate change. There is
one Article (20.15) encouraging cooperation in ‘transitions
to a low emissions and resilient economy.’ Yet it is signifi-
cant that the TPP could make subsidies that overfish lim-
ited stocks subject to a trade dispute but not do the same
for fossil fuel subsidies, or to specifically exclude subsidies
for non-fossil fuel ‘green energy’ alternatives from either
an ISDS or state-to-state dispute.
The Labour Chapter requires Parties to ‘adopt and main-
tain’ labour rights as laid out in the ILO (International
Labour Organization) Declaration, regarding freedom of
association, collective bargaining, elimination of forced
labour, abolition of child labour, and elimination of employ-
ment discrimination (art.19.3, ¶1). Commitments appear to
extend only to the declaration and not the actual conven-
tions, as the TPPA countries, with the exception of Peru
and Chile, have failed to ratify the eight fundamental ILO
conventions; Brunei and the US, two other TPPA Parties,
have each ratified only two [26]. Moreover, a violation of
the Chapter’s obligations under the ILO Declaration applies
only insofar that it affects ‘trade or investment between the
Parties’. Otherwise, TPPA countries can maintain whatever
non-compliant labour rights practices they choose, includ-
ing child labour, which is discouraged but not explicitly
banned (art.19.6).
Who benefits?
The material above forces the question: who actually ben-
efits from such trade and investment deals? The TPPA
signing was announced by governments with the standard
claim of its potentially huge economic benefits. To the ex-
tent that the Agreement’s economic gains benefit all coun-
tries, are substantial, and ‘trickle down’ in a somewhat
equitable fashion to all workers, there is a potentially
powerful and positive health benefit as people accumulate
more of the resources needed to lead a healthy life. But
these outcomes are far from certain, or even likely. The
most widely cited estimate of TPPA annual income gains
(achieved only by 2025) average only 0.5 % of GDP across
the 12 Parties, just 0.2 % more than global economic in-
come gains (the background trend) over the same period
[27]. High-income TPPA Parties will gain less, lower-
income TPPA Parties more. The econometric models used
to make this prediction, however, are based on full employ-
ment—that all labour loss in non-competitive sectors is
absorbed by growth in competitive ones. Empirically, this
has rarely been the case, which governments appear to
accept given, for example, Canada’s commitment of over
CAD 5 billion to two sectors (automotive and dairy farm-
ing) expected to lose as a result of the TPPA [28].
Another problem with most static models is that they as-
sume invariant income distribution and thus do not
recognize inequitable impacts of FTAs. Alternative, more
dynamic econometric models come to different conclu-
sions. A recent study using the United Nations Global
Policy Model database predicts mild economic losses for
developed TPPA economies (-0.04 % average annual GDP
change) and insignificant growth for developing economies
(+0.22 % average annual GDP change), and expects the loss
of a total of 650,000 jobs across all TPPA countries. It also
notes that inequality is likely going to increase further as
the share of GDP going to capital will rise while the share
going to labour will decline, continuing a trend that set in
with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s [29]. Another
study also expects the economic gains of the TPPA to be
distributed unevenly amongst the population, with the bot-
tom 90 % of wage earners losing ground, while the top 1 %
will gain economically, even if not by much [30].
Although TPPA developing countries may do better than
their wealthier trading Parties, TPPA rules that limit or
foreclose the use of government procurement or state-
owned enterprises to discriminate in favour of local
employers, or which forbid imposing any domestic per-
formance requirements on foreign investment, will leave
national economic development policy increasingly in the
hands of private companies and international investors.
Conclusion
Given the paltry economic gains from the TPPA, and
the various direct and indirect health risks it poses, from
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a strictly public health vantage, this is not a good Agree-
ment. Whether it ever manages to reach ratification is
an open question. Without US ratification, which may
await the next Presidential election in November 2016,
there is no deal. Much effort has gone into TPPA negoti-
ations, but without a transparent or evidence-based set
of arguments for its necessity or its far-reaching public
policy impacts. In the context of the COP21 climate
change Agreement, and the UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, this may be an opportune time for TPPA
countries to reject it as drafted, and rethink what should
be the purpose of such agreements in light of (still) es-
calating global wealth inequalities and fragile environ-
mental resources—the two most foundational elements
to global health equity.
Endnotes
1Non-discrimination means that foreign investors are
treated no differently than domestic investors who, it is
useful to note, are not eligible to use ISDS, since these
rules apply only to foreign investors.
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